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Abstract
■ Cognitive neuroscience, as a discipline, links the biological
systems studied by neuroscience to the processing constructs
studied by psychology. By mapping these relations throughout
the literature of cognitive neuroscience, we visualize the seman-
tic structure of the discipline and point to directions for future
research that will advance its integrative goal. For this purpose,
network text analyses were applied to an exhaustive corpus of
abstracts collected from five major journals over a 30-month
period, including every study that used fMRI to investigate
psychological processes. From this, we generate network maps
that illustrate the relationships among psychological and anato-
mical terms, along with centrality statistics that guide inferences
about network structure. Three terms—prefrontal cortex,
amygdala, and anterior cingulate cortex—dominate the net-
work structure with their high frequency in the literature and
the density of their connections with other neuroanatomical
terms. From network statistics, we identify terms that are under-
studied compared with their importance in the network (e.g.,
insula and thalamus), are underspecified in the language of
the discipline (e.g., terms associated with executive function),
or are imperfectly integrated with other concepts (e.g., sub-
disciplines like decision neuroscience that are disconnected from
the main network). Taking these results as the basis for prescrip-
tive recommendations, we conclude that semantic analyses pro-
vide useful guidance for cognitive neuroscience as a discipline,
both by illustrating systematic biases in the conduct and presen-
tation of research and by identifying directions that may be most
productive for future research. ■
INTRODUCTION
In its relatively brief history, cognitive neuroscience has
emerged from an amorphous integration of systems
neuroscience, computational neuroscience, and cognitive
psychology into a mature enterprise with hundreds of
newly published studies every month. Results obtained
using the core techniques of cognitive neuroscience—
notably fMRI—now shape our understanding not only of
brain function but also of associated psychological and
computational concepts. Each new experiment establishes
or strengthens links between the neural structures studied
by neuroscience and the cognitive and behavioral con-
structs revealed by psychology. Over time, studies combine
into a web of accumulated knowledge (i.e., a semantic
structure) that links brain function to cognition.
Mapping the semantic structure of cognitive neuro-
science would have important consequences. To the
extent that the existing research is a true reflection of
the relationship between brain and cognition, syntheses
can illustrate commonalities across many studies. Re-
cent years have seen an increase in the use of formal
methods for unbiased synthesis of the literature (Levallois,
Clithero, Wouters, Smidts, & Huettel, 2012; Evans &
Foster, 2011; Shiffrin & Borner, 2004). Such methods
range from those that combine patterns of activation
across studies to identify associations between mental
processes and locations in the brain (e.g., activation like-
lihood estimation; Yarkoni, Poldrack, Nichols, Van Essen,
& Wager, 2011; Yarkoni, Poldrack, Van Essen, & Wager,
2010; Nielsen, 2009; Van Essen, 2009) to those that employ
statistical analyses of many studies using bibliometrics and
co-citation analyses (Behrens, Fox, Laird, & Smith, 2013;
Viedma-del-Jesus, Perakakis, Munoz, Lopez-Herrera, & Vila,
2011; Bruer, 2004, 2010; Burright, Hahn, & Antonisse,
2005; Robins, Gosling, & Craik, 1999). Linking these dif-
ferent levels are new forms of ontological meta-analyses
that characterize the conceptual framework among find-
ings in cognitive neuroscience, so that new results can be
integrated into a semantic infrastructure (Poldrack et al.,
2011; Poldrack, 2010).
An alternative approach to meta-analysis—semantic
network analysis—examines the textual properties of a cor-
pus (e.g., published articles within a scientific discipline)
to examine the interrelations of its constituent elements.
These techniques combine information about the co-
occurrence of individual terms to produce maps of their
interrelations and therefore provide an aggregate means
by which to visually and statistically map concepts that
appear in the larger literature (Diesner & Carley, 2005;
Mehl, 2005; Popping, 2000; Carley, 1997). This approach
has both practical and analytic advantages. It leverages
the accessibility of digital articles, avoiding the difficulty
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of compiling primary data from a large and exponentially
growing literature. Moreover, it can provide insight into
how knowledge is organized in the minds of authors and
is expressed in the discourse of their published findings.
The meaningful elements of a discipline (e.g., key terms)
can be combined into a semantic structure that reflects
the superordinate conceptual level through which results
are interpreted and hypotheses are conceived.
The semantic structure of cognitive neuroscience need
not be isomorphic with the natural phenomena it investi-
gates, because of biases inherent in common research
practices. A first and well-recognized source of bias comes
from increasing specialization by researchers. Research
on a given topic may proceed rapidly within one specialty,
but incrementally in another—and the boundaries be-
tween different specialties may be more or less permeable.
Second, imprecision in terminology may lead to both
unnecessary distinctions and unwanted conflations. What
one study describes as working memory, another may
posit as cognitive control. Even the labeling of brain
regions can be subject to terminological biases; witness,
for example, the variation in what parts of the medial
frontal lobe are subsumed within anterior cingulate
cortex. Third, once a brain structure is linked to some
function, that link can shape the direction of future re-
search, both because of the tendency to favor information
consistent with preexisting beliefs (i.e., confirmation
bias) and reification of concepts by applying old labels
to new findings. Collectively, these biases could lead to
large-scale gaps in the literature. Such understudied topics
or brain structures would not be evident within traditional
research syntheses—but they may be uncovered by ex-
amining anomalies in the fieldʼs semantic structure, as
has been done for other fields like sociology (Moody &
Light, 2006).
Network analytic techniques can provide an important
tool for identifying such biases and anomalies and for
evaluating their impact. If the semantic structure obtained
from the text perfectly tracks existing relationships, then
the network is expected to have certain properties. Cen-
trality measures, for example, provide statistical assess-
ments of a termʼs placement within the larger network
(e.g., terms with high betweenness centrality often lie
along the shortest paths between other terms in the net-
work), and it would be expected that higher centrality
would be positively correlated with term frequency, be-
cause frequent terms are more likely to have systematic
connections with other terms. Some terms, however, may
be outliers—such that they are more or less central than
their frequency would predict. Identification of these terms
can reveal inefficiencies within the literature (e.g., con-
firmation biases, over- or underemphasis on research on
a topic) and provide an important means to scrutinize the
knowledge structure contained within a body of text.
Here, we apply techniques of network analysis to a
comprehensive corpus from the literature. This method
is particularly suitable for cognitive neuroscience, given
the fieldʼs goal of building links between two distinct
semantic categories (i.e., brain structures and cognitive
functions). Moreover, each of these categories has mean-
ingful internal organization: Brain structures are frequently
organized into systems that describe processing pathways,
whereas cognitive functions are grouped into higher-level
concepts that label their shared computations. By map-
ping the relationships within and across the anatomical
and conceptual components of cognitive neuroscience,
we not only characterize the current structure of the dis-
cipline but also identify anomalies that indicate important
directions for future research. Like a geographic atlas,
our network maps describe both well-trodden and familiar
research paths as well as islands of uncharted territory.
METHODS
Assembly of the Corpus
We sought a representative sample of articles in the field
of cognitive neuroscience, which we defined operationally
through a selection of contemporary papers with the
common aim of relating brain anatomy with behavioral
function. For this purpose, we collected every article pub-
lished between January 1, 2008 and June 30, 2010 in five
leading journals: Nature Neuroscience, Neuron, Journal
of Cognitive Neuroscience, Neuroimage, and Journal of
Neuroscience. This raw corpus contained 7675 studies,
which were individually assessed for adherence to the
following conditions for inclusion:
A. Use of fMRI for primary data collection.
B. Stated goals of understanding links between the human
brain and some psychological function.
C. A report of empirical data collected for the current
article.
The rationale for each criterion is discussed below. After
discarding articles that did not meet these standards,
the corpus was narrowed to 1127 studies. The text of
the corpus consisted of the title and abstract of each
accepted article.
Criterion A
By restricting our analysis to studies that employed a
common neuroimaging method, we minimized differ-
ences in terminology and rhetoric. fMRI was selected
because of its popularity: It was the most widely used
human neuroimaging technique in the unfiltered pool
of studies (employed by 1359 before applying the sec-
ond criterion). In comparison, all other human imaging
techniques combined were less than half as frequent:
EEG (346), PET (120), and TMS (109). In the case that a
study made use of more than one technique, it was ac-
cepted only if its empirical conclusions depended directly
on fMRI data. Hence, whereas synchronous EEG-fMRI
studies were included, fMRI-guided TMS studies were
1950 Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience Volume 26, Number 9
not. We note that fMRI is used for investigation of prac-
tically all concepts in cognitive neuroscience, making its
studies a good proxy for the larger literature.
Criterion B
The second criterion ensured that our studies were clearly
within cognitive neuroscience, as commonly defined. We
excluded methodological studies, such as those that
sought to advance fMRI technology, to develop tasks for
fMRI experiments, or to characterize the fMRI hemo-
dynamic response. Studies that used fMRI for atlas gen-
eration were likewise discarded, as they did not aim to
correlate brain anatomy with psychological function.
Animal studies were not included because of the in-
congruences between humans and animals in brain
organization and behavioral repertoire.
Criterion C
Finally, we limited the corpus to empirical articles pre-
senting new fMRI data. This restriction minimized bias
from articles reinterpreting or reanalyzing former results.
Meta-analyses and review articles were thus omitted, as
were studies that applied novel statistical or computational
models to previously published data.
Term Classification and Text Preprocessing
Separate semantic categories were created for anatomy
and concept terms. Anatomy terms referred to either
a brain structure (e.g., hippocampus) or a functionally
defined region (e.g., fusiform face area). Concept terms
were either a domain of cognitive neuroscience (e.g.,
memory), a process within a domain (e.g., working
memory), or a property of the experimental stimuli (e.g.,
face or risk).
A list of all unique words (15,127) in the corpus of
abstracts was generated and sorted by frequency, and
the 100 most frequent anatomy and concept terms were
manually identified (Appendix 1 and 2). The terms used
to generate the networks were the most frequent word
forms to appear in the text after preprocessing. The final
judgment of term appropriateness for the two lists was
made by two expert raters (authors LGA and SAH) who
evaluated every candidate term.
The corpus was preprocessed in Automap (Carley,
2010a) to normalize for grammatical variants of anatomy
and concept terms. Because standard thesauri include
neither neuroanatomical terms nor the jargon of cog-
nitive neuroscience, we authored custom thesauri. First,
a bigram thesaurus was created to collapse word pairs to
single words by replacing spaces with underscores. This
involved generating a frequency-sorted semantic list,
identifying anatomy or concept word pairs that appeared
at a higher frequency than the 100th most frequent anat-
omy or concept term and creating a list of the word pairs
and the consolidated terms. The process iterated for
longer phrases, for example, primary somatosensory was
converted to primary_somatosensory and then primary_
somatosensory cortex became primary_somatosensory_
cortex. Adjustments were made to the top 100 lists of
anatomy and concept terms after the bigram thesaurus
was applied to accommodate phrases that appeared at
higher frequencies than the initially identified one-word
terms. Second, a generalization thesaurus was created to
normalize for plurals, acronyms, and hyphenated com-
pounds. All instances of plurals were normalized, but
the remaining entries in the bigram and generalization
thesauri were created only for variants that appeared at
a higher frequency than the 100th anatomy or concept
term. The lowest frequency threshold was imposed to limit
manual searching for variants in the frequency list. Finally,
titles were assigned to nodes on the visualization after
capitalizing terms and separating consolidated phrases
into single words.
Network Generation
Automap software was used to generate a meta-network
comprised of links within and between anatomy and
concept node classes. The Conceptual, Anatomical, and
Functional Networks are substructures within this meta-
network. A link was identified as the co-occurrence of
two terms within a moving window of six adjacent words
that appeared in the same sentence. The selection of
these parameters was made based on previous text ana-
lytic studies (Diesner & Carley, 2004) and supported by a
series of systematic analyses. To check that the network
structure is robust against window size manipulations,
additional networks were generated across a range of
the window size parameter. This analysis revealed that
the mean betweenness centrality was relatively stable at
widow sizes greater than four words in length. Thus, a
network derived from a moving window of six words
possesses a structure that is maintained across small
manipulations of the window size parameter.
Links were directed from the first to the second term, as
read from left to right across the text within the window.
Link weights were calculated from the sum of term co-
occurrences throughout the corpus and were used to
construct the three networks: Conceptual (concepts to
concepts), Anatomical (anatomy to anatomy), and Func-
tional (anatomy to concepts and concepts to anatomy).
To confirm that the structure of these networks is de-
pendent on the relative position of words in the text, ad-
ditional networks were generated from a text-scrambled
version of the corpus. Networks generated from these
scrambled texts were organized with central positions
occupied by the most frequent terms, as expected from a
frequency-weighted probability of random co-occurrences
between terms. Likewise, the discrete nodal connections in
these scrambled networks varied from those in the original
networks and did not provide any meaningful structure
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for concepts or anatomy, thereby providing confirmation
that the networks under consideration are in fact depen-
dent on the word arrangements in the original corpus.
Network Visualization
The networks were visualized using Organization Risk
Analyzer software (Carley, 2010b). Nodes were sized in
proportion to frequency and colored according to mem-
bership in the anatomy or concept node class. The relative
thickness of lines was scaled to link weight, and arrow-
heads were added to indicate link directionality. We
selected the threshold for link weighting to restrict the
network visualizations to the 50 most strongly connected
nodes. In the case of the Functional Network, because
there were not 50 nodes at the same weighting level,
54 nodes were retained. To ensure that the visualizations
contained structures insensitive to thresholding, we
assessed the number of links visualized at every threshold
level. Whereas the weakest links were eliminated rapidly
with increasing threshold, the rate of decrease in link
number neared zero at and above the thresholds we
selected. This result affirmed both that unstable structures
were eliminated from the visualizations and that the struc-
tures we visualized were upheld across a wide range of
thresholds levels.
To further aid in visualization, a hyperbolic magnification
was applied to expand the center of each network. The
positions of some nodes were manually adjusted within a
small radius to minimize overlapping of links and node
titles. Islands of more than one node that exceeded thresh-
old and were isolated from the main network were repo-
sitioned to improve the visualization layout, while still
maintaining the local network structure of the island.
Network Measures
Quantitative analysis of the networks was conducted
through Organization Risk Analyzer software. Measures
were computed for all nodes, including nodes below
the threshold for visualization. On the level of the entire
network, density was calculated from the ratio of the
number of links to the maximum possible number of
links. Node level measures of centrality were calculated
for total degree, eigenvector, and betweenness (Carley
& Reminga, 2004; Freeman, 1977).
Total degree is a simple measure of the amount of
information that passes through a node. It was computed
as the number of other terms to which each term was
directly linked. Nodes with high degree centrality are
characterized by a high informational load because of
the density of their connections, yet because degree is
a local measure, they do not necessarily carry the rela-
tional information that determines the global structure
of a network. For this reason, we calculate two more
sophisticated centrality metrics: eigenvector centrality
and betweenness centrality.
Eigenvector centrality is a measure of a nodeʼs
connectedness—specifically, of the extent to which a
node is linked to other highly linked nodes. The eigen-
vector centrality of a node is proportional to the sum
of the eigenvectors of its first-degree neighbors. In some
network structures, terms with high eigenvector cen-
trality cluster in a hub at the center of the network, sur-
rounded by groups of terms at the periphery that are
more strongly intraconnected than they are connected
to rest of the network. Identifying terms that form cen-
tral hubs is important for understanding how distinct
domains are related at the core of the discipline. Although
we use eigenvector centrality to quantify the positive orga-
nization of terms that we observe in the network visualiza-
tions, we require another measure to identify anomalies
of the network structure.
Betweenness centrality is a measure of the bridging role
a node plays between regions throughout the network,
computed as the proportion of times a term fell on the
shortest path between pairs of other terms. Of particular
interest will be nodes that have high betweenness central-
ity despite being of low frequency; we highlight those
nodes as targets for research that seeks to strengthen
relationships between subfields.
We found that total degree centrality was correlated
with frequency (R2 = .89 for the Conceptual Network,
R2 = .75 for the Anatomical Network; R2 = .67 and .89
for the concept and anatomy nodes of the Functional
Network, respectively). Because of this correlation and to
ease interpretability, frequency was used as a proxy for
degree centrality in plots of centrality measures. Between-
ness centrality was plotted against frequency to identify
nodes that are more important to the network than
predicted by their popularity in the literature.
The Functional Network consists of two component
(unidirectional) two-mode networks: the anatomy-by-
concept and the concept-by-anatomy. For the visualiza-
tion, these networks share a single projection and the
direction of the arrow indicates the two-mode component
network for a given link. Quantitative analysis of each two-
mode network was conducted independently (i.e., taking
into account directionality in the text), and the visualiza-
tion shows the combination of the two analyses.
Second-level Positional Analyses
The Conceptual, Anatomical, and Functional Networks
were projected to show shared links between nodes.
Unlike traditional cluster analyses that pair nodes in a
hierarchical fashion beginning with the strongest first-
degree connections, our approach computes a weighted
measure of how similar two nodes are in their connec-
tions throughout the network. The resulting second-order
positional networks convey information about global
similarities in connectivity within each link. Strong connec-
tions between nodes in such networks can indicate terms
that perform similar roles in the literature, as in the case
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where they operate as structural synonyms that can be
interchangeable across contexts.
First, adjacency matrices of link weights between
concept-by-concept, anatomy-by-anatomy, and concept-
by-anatomy nodes were extracted from the networks.
Structural similarity was then computed in MATLAB by
calculating the correlation coefficient between each row.
The structural similarity measures were used to create
second-order networks that were visualized in UCINET
(Borgatti, Everett, & Freeman, 2002) and thresholded
by link weight to show the top 20 most strongly con-
nected nodes. Although thresholding resulted in a higher
proportion of nodes belonging to dyads or triads than
larger multinode structures compared with unthresholded
projections, the elimination of weak higher-order struc-
tures is suited to our aim of identifying nodes with the
most closely correlated connectivity patterns as structural
synonyms.
RESULTS
Applying network analytic techniques led to the construc-
tion of three networks: a Conceptual Network, reflecting
connections between concept terms (e.g., memory to
representation); an Anatomical Network, reflecting
connections between brain structures (e.g., prefrontal
cortex to hippocampus); and a Functional Network, re-
flecting connections between concept terms and brain
structures (e.g., amygdala to emotion). These three
networks provide distinct insights into how the field of
cognitive neuroscience semantically links cognitive con-
cepts, brain structures, and their functional relations,
respectively.
Conceptual Structure
Examination of the Conceptual Network (Figure 1A) re-
vealed a central hub of core concepts that, with their con-
nections, group into three divisions: perception/attention,
representation/memory, and cognition/control. As a result
of their positions near highly linked nodes, the terms that
fall along the central hub each rank high in eigenvector
centrality (vision is 2nd, attention is 4th, object is 6th,
control is 7th, representation is 9th, and motor is 18th). Of
these, most counterintuitive is that memory—the second-
most-common conceptual term in the literature and ranked
first in eigenvector centrality—does not fall along the
central hub but instead lies within a strongly interconnected
cluster of terms that describe both semantic properties
(i.e., representation, category) and the storage and manip-
ulation of those properties (i.e., recognition).
Notable, as well, is the presence of groups of terms that
are disconnected from the main network. The largest of
Figure 1. Conceptual Network visualization and measures. (A) Network visualization representing the psychological underpinnings of the
cognitive neuroscience field (density = 0.28). The top 50 strongest linked terms as determined by a link weighting threshold (>51). Term
frequency is indicated by the diameter of each node. Link weight is indicated by line width and directionality (in the text) is shown by the arrows.
(B) Plot of betweenness centrality versus frequency for the 50 concept terms visualized.
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these, shown at bottom left, contains key concepts related
to decision-making, such as risk and reward. A natural inter-
pretation is that research investigating these concepts—
often considered within the emerging discipline of
neuroeconomics (Smith & Huettel, 2010)—has proceeded
as an autonomous discipline with its own well-developed
internal structure of concepts. The distribution of intra-
island connections is skewed toward higher link weights
than the distribution of interisland connections, so the
island is more strongly interconnected than it is con-
nected to the rest of the network. We note that this
disconnection is not a function of an arbitrary display
threshold: At every possible threshold, the connections
within the neuroeconomics cluster are substantially
stronger than the connections from that group to the main
body of the network.
For each term in the conceptual network, we examined
the relationship between two measures of network cen-
trality (Figure 1B). As might be expected, more common
terms (frequency; x axis) tend to serve more of a linking
role in the network (betweenness; y axis). Yet, these statis-
tical measures reveal that terms tend to cluster along two
sequences, as evident from the bimodal nature of the
graph. At bottom right lie the canonical domains of cog-
nitive neuroscience (e.g., vision, memory, attention);
despite their frequency, these terms do not support
many links between other concepts in the discipline (i.e.,
they have lower-than-predicted betweenness). At the top
of the plot reside processes that span those domains
(e.g., emotion, control, selection); although not as fre-
quent, these terms have high betweenness and serve a
bridging role within the network.
Anatomical Structure
The network map of anatomical structures (Figure 2A),
unlike the conceptual map just described, neither ex-
hibited a central hub nor self-organized into categorical
groupings. Instead, its structure was dominated by three
terms, each highly frequent and each densely intercon-
nected with other nodes: prefrontal cortex, amygdala,
and anterior cingulate. From these and other common
terms, long branches linked successions of terms within
processing pathways (e.g., a sensorimotor branch linking
cortical and subcortical regions, beginning at S1/S2 and
ending with the basal ganglia). Three groups of terms
were unconnected to the main network: two of these de-
scribed visual regions and one characterized subregions
in prefrontal and parietal cortex. In the aggregate, this
network was markedly less dense (0.13) and had propor-
tionally fewer interconnections than the conceptual net-
work (0.28). Moreover, the connections only imperfectly
track known anatomical relations.
Analysis of network centrality statistics (Figure 2B)
revealed that several anatomical regions occupy a dis-
proportionally central place in the network compared
with their frequency. The thalamus and insula had the
Figure 2. Anatomical Network visualization and measures. (A) Network visualization representing the anatomical underpinnings of the cognitive
neuroscience field (density = 0.13). The top 50 strongest linked terms as determined by a link weighting threshold (>21). (B) Plot of betweenness
centrality versus frequency for the 50 anatomical terms visualized.
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highest and second-highest betweenness centrality of
any structure, despite only being the 15th and 9th most
common terms, respectively. These outliers tend to co-
occur in the literature with a diverse array of other re-
gions, potentially reflecting their contributions to many
of the processes studied by cognitive neuroscience.
Furthermore, their network statistics (i.e., high between-
ness relative to frequency) means that additional studies
of their function would have the greatest effects on the
overall character of the network. Accordingly, we consider
them particularly important targets for future research.
Functional Structure
We constructed a network containing bidirectional links
between concepts and anatomy; this two-mode Functional
Network (Figure 3A) provides the most direct example
of the semantic structure of cognitive neuroscience. Al-
though this network contains similar numbers of terms
in each category, its structure is driven by anatomical
terms. The network statistics (Figure 3B) revealed that
anatomical terms have higher betweenness centrality than
conceptual terms, although the latter are more frequent.
That is, information about anatomy contributes more
than information about concepts in defining relation-
ships within the literature. Of the anatomical terms, four
are the most central in this network: prefrontal cortex,
amygdala, parietal cortex, and hippocampus.
Conversely, many of the high-frequency conceptual
terms are on the margins of the network. Some are pen-
dants with only one above-threshold connection, for exam-
ple, object, emotion, information, observation. Others are
part of dyads or triads that are disconnected from the main
network at this threshold, for example, V1 and representa-
tion. Such results may seem paradoxical because, as
noted previously, some of these terms were highly central
within the map of concepts themselves. Yet, this functional
map provides different information, in that it considers only
links across categories. Thus, terms that may be very cen-
tral in the conceptual map (i.e., the bridging processes de-
scribed earlier) may be on the periphery of the current
functional map if they are primarily linked to one or a small
set of brain regions (e.g., emotion to the amygdala)—
whether because of functional specificity or because new
research tends to reify the results of older studies.
Structural Synonymy
For all three analyses described above, we created
second-order positional networks based on the structural
Figure 3. Functional Network of links between concept and anatomical terms. (A) Network visualization representing the interconnection
between conceptual (red) and anatomical (blue) terminology used in the field of cognitive neuroscience (density = 0.04). The top 54 strongest
linked terms as determined by a link weighting threshold (>12). (B) Plot of betweenness centrality versus frequency for the 54 anatomical
terms visualized. Anatomy terms have steeper linear regression slopes, indicating the anatomical terms have higher betweenness centrality
than conceptual terms and suggesting that information about anatomy contributes more than information about concepts in defining the
overall structure of the Functional Network.
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similarity between each node in the first-order network
(Figures 4–6). Links indicate terms that occupy similar
positions in a network and therefore represent semantic
synonyms. For example, in the second-order functional
network, two concepts might be linked because they
reliably engage the same brain regions, because they
are used interchangeably to describe a mental process,
or both. Identifying such similarities is important because
they suggest aspects of the literature that deserve fur-
ther refinement, either through creation of a new super-
ordinate category or through the purging of unneeded
synonyms. Here, we highlight some key examples of
terms occupying similar places in the networks.
Analyses of the conceptual and anatomical maps re-
vealed numerous small groups of terms that carry rela-
tively similar meaning (e.g., future and anticipation) or
that come from the same circumscribed area of the litera-
ture (e.g., reward and risk). More intriguing were several
larger groups of terms that were highly interconnected.
The single largest grouping in any analysis comprised
seven concept terms that all described aspects of con-
trol processing (e.g., top–down, executive, inhibition),
indicating that this topic area contains a number of highly
similar concepts that remain imperfectly distinguished
from each other. Therewas also a notable group of anatom-
ical terms that clearly define distinct regions (e.g., anterior
insula, thalamus), but that share the property of being
connected to awider range of cortical regions. This not only
provides additional evidence for the characterization of
these regions as important building links within the dis-
cipline but also argues that new research has room to
further elaborate their distinct roles in processing.
DISCUSSION
Cognitive neuroscience, despite its relative youth as a
discipline, now evinces a well-defined semantic structure
of brain-to-behavior mappings. Traditional meta-analytic
Figure 4. Map of structural
similarity for the Conceptual
Network. Shown are the
top 21 concept nodes of the
second-order Conceptual
Network, thresholded at link
weight 0.70. Link terms occupy
similar places in the network
and therefore represent
semantic synonyms.
Figure 5. Map of structural
similarity for the Anatomical
Network. The top 20 anatomy
nodes, link weight greater
than 0.73, are displayed
for the second-order
Anatomical Network.
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approaches focus on the quantitative consistency of spe-
cific research findings (e.g., activation likelihood estima-
tion) or on the connections among different topics (e.g.,
ontologies) and researchers (e.g., citation analyses). Our
approach, in contrast, characterizes how cognitive neuro-
science presents itself to the larger scientific commu-
nity, through the summaries of individual articles within
their titles and abstracts. Cognitive neuroscience is well
matched to this approach: It has become a linking dis-
cipline that now constructs numerous bridges between
the brain structures studied by neuroscience and the
constructs created by psychology (Bassett & Gazzaniga,
2011; Gonsalves & Cohen, 2010; Shimamura, 2010).
The core challenge for cognitive neuroscience, at pre-
sent, is synthesizing across those many links—it must
distill its massive and rapidly expanding literature into
smaller sets of core principles.
Semantic analyses, like those in the current project,
identify structural properties within a corpus in a data-
driven and largely endogenous manner. Constructing a
corpus from abstracts, however, poses challenges because
no abstract perfectly recapitulates its source experiment.
Instead, authors construct an abstract through some com-
plex combination of the experimental results, the filtering
of those results by perceived importance, their own rheto-
rical and semantic goals, and disciplinary considerations
that shape how topics are chosen and reported (Samraj,
2005; Lores, 2004). Authors may specify terms to varying
degrees depending on where they choose to draw anatom-
ical or theoretical boundaries, altering the shape of the
semantic structure at the level of individual nodes. To
avoid imposing an additional layer of subjectivity by select-
ing terms based on expert opinion alone, we applied
thresholds to sift out the most frequent terms in the litera-
ture for inclusion in the word lists used to generate the
networks.
Moreover, the co-occurrence of two concepts within
a particular abstract could reflect a positive association,
a negative association, or even a speculation about the
need for future research. A similar uncertainty is seen
in co-citation analyses, such that a given article may be
cited both by articles that agree with and that disagree
with its findings. Yet, the very pairing of two concepts still
provides important information, even considering the
Figure 6. Map of structural
similarity for the Functional
Network. Relative structural
similarity was visualized
separately for concept nodes
(red) and anatomy nodes
(blue) of the Functional
Network. The second-order
Conceptual Network revealed
20 nodes above a link
weight threshold of 0.71;
the second-order Anatomical
Network shows 20 nodes
above a threshold of 0.66.
Nodes connected in these
networks have structural
similarity in how they
connect to the other
node class.
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above limitations. For example, when individuals query
internet search engines like Google, typical search strings
involve simple juxtaposition of terms, not operators that
qualify their relationships—and the search engines will
return pages that contain those terms regardless of their
semantic relationship. The corpus (in this analogy, inter-
net content) has an underlying structure that facilitates
extraction of valuable information. Thus, despite their
limitations, these network analyses allow quantification of
the relationships among concepts that have broad preva-
lence as well as how those concepts combine into semantic
networks. Future applications that account for these rhe-
torical associations may yield deeper insight into the
knowledge structures under scrutiny.
Negative Structure: Bridging Islands and
Filling Gaps
A powerful feature of semantic network analysis is that it
can identify inefficiencies in network structure, as when
a local region of the network has more or fewer connec-
tions than expected based on the overall network statis-
tics (Evans & Foster, 2011). Our analyses indicate that
the current cognitive neuroscience literature contains
two sorts of inefficiencies, which we colloquially label
“islands” and “gaps.”
The islands in each of our maps are visually obvious
as small groups of terms whose connectedness is much
greater within their own group than to the main body of
the network. Islands are not in themselves problematic;
in fact, for biological systems, the restricted milieu of an
island may be an important contributor to accelerated
evolution (Millien, 2006). Similarly, the (metaphorical)
islands in our network may indicate new semantic dis-
tinctions between concepts that can lead to a specialized
subdiscipline where research can proceed more rapidly
than in the main discipline. Over time, reestablishment
of connections to the larger network will provide channels
for reentrant flow of novel findings. Consider the prom-
inent island of concepts terms from economics (see
Figure 1A). Over the past decade, research on the neural
basis of decision-making has progressed largely apace
from cognitive neuroscience, in large part because of its
focus on economic decision variables rather than psycho-
logical processes. The result has been a small, high-profile
literature that shares methods, but not conceptual frame-
works, with research on other aspects of cognition. Yet,
even this clear island shows evidence of coming closer to
the mainland. Mainstream work on models of cognitive
control in prefrontal cortex now connects to neuro-
economic studies of self-control in decision-making;
conversely, information about potential rewards is now
recognized as having broad effects throughout the brain
(Vickery, Chun, & Lee, 2011), influencing basic functions
of perception (Serences, 2008) andmemory (Han, Huettel,
Raposo, Adcock, & Dobbins, 2010). In essence, new
bridges are being built to all three divisions of the cog-
nitive network. One natural prediction, accordingly, is
that neuroeconomics will become more, not less inte-
grated into cognitive neuroscience over the coming years
(Levallois et al., 2012).
The gaps in each network are not obvious from its
visual structure, but they can be appreciated from the net-
work statistics: terms with high betweenness centrality
relative to their frequency. Key examples from the Ana-
tomical Network include insula and thalamus, each
of which was much less frequent but more central than
terms like amygdala, hippocampus, and parietal cortex.
Within the Conceptual Network, process terms like selec-
tion, emotion, and control are more central than, but
not as frequent as, domain terms like vision, memory,
and reward. Additional research on gap terms like insula
would have the effect of strengthening connections be-
tween disparate parts of the network, which in turn would
increase the coherence of the discipline. Conversely, a
continuing focus on high-frequency, low-centrality terms
risks creating subdisciplinary islands. Collectively the posi-
tive and negative structures illustrated in these examples
reveal instances where topics are over- or underrepre-
sented and can be used to indicate areas of research that
might be pursued most profitably.
Positive Structure: Conceptual Hubs and
Anatomical Branches
From the vantage point provided by semantic network
analyses, several unexpected structural features are evi-
dent. In particular, psychological concepts and anatomical
terms have qualitatively and quantitatively distinct organi-
zations. Conceptual terms are organized around a central
hub with three primary divisions: perception/attention,
representation, and control. In contrast, no such core
exists for the anatomical network. Rather, the structure
of this network is dominated by a few frequent and
densely interconnected terms, which feed into long
branches associated with individual processing streams.
Anatomical terms also have higher betweenness centrality
than conceptual terms within the Functional Network; this
means that the structure of that network tends to be driven
by a small set of anatomical terms.
Historical and rhetorical factors likely shape the differ-
ent roles that conceptual and anatomical terms play with-
in the cognitive neuroscience literature (Mays & Jung,
2012; Jack & Appelbaum, 2010). The semantic organiza-
tion of psychological concepts builds on more than one
hundred years of academic history, which in turn grew
out of the ancient and intuitive interest in how our minds
work. The Conceptual Network (Figure 1A) recapitulates
the long-standing division of the mind into stages of
information processing: perceiving something, repre-
senting it in memory, and then controlling behavior
accordingly. In contrast, cognitive neuroscience itself
has shaped how modern neuroscience organizes brain
anatomy. Traditional core elements of brain structure
1958 Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience Volume 26, Number 9
(e.g., the brainstem, hypothalamus) are simply absent
from the Anatomical Network (Figure 2B). Replacing
them are new divisions of the cerebral cortex identified
both anatomically (e.g., anterior insula) and functionally
(e.g., fusiform face area). If cognitive neuroscienceʼs
core goal is to reconcile models of the mind and brain,
then progress toward that goal will cause these two net-
works to come more into alignment. A natural prediction,
therefore, is that the single-brain-region terms that now
dominate the current literature will gradually be replaced
by systems-level descriptions (e.g., default network).
Cognitive neuroscience, accordingly, will treat infor-
mation processing as arising not from individual brain
regions interacting along a unidirectional path but from
sets of local networks that jointly support complex
cognition.
Appendix 1. Concept Terms, Frequencies, and Centralities
Rank Term Frequency Conceptual Betweenness Functional Betweenness
1 vision 637 0.0209 0.0541
2 memory 556 0.0196 0.0211
3 behavior 497 0.0705 0.0224
4 information 490 0.0129 0.0269
5 attention 488 0.0116 0.0308
6 representation 450 0.0272 0.0448
7 control 449 0.0455 0.0309
8 object 442 0.0083 0.0215
9 perception 439 0.0182 0.026
10 cognition 434 0.0525 0.0191
11 observation 422 0.0217 0.0933
12 learning 420 0.0523 0.024
13 emotion 409 0.0536 0.0297
14 action 365 0.0224 0.019
15 motor 344 0.0074 0.0398
16 face 342 0.022 0.0113
17 word 339 0.0404 0.005
18 reward 319 0.0164 0.0067
19 selection 312 0.0515 0.0439
20 movement 282 0.0318 0.0064
21 language 263 0.0095 0.0049
22 semantic 261 0.0103 0.0079
23 prediction 257 0.024 0.0362
24 auditory 252 0.0208 0.0117
25 spatial 250 0.0431 0.007
26 retrieval 247 0.0083 0.0145
27 speech 240 0.0119 0.0047
28 target 240 0.0078 0.0099
29 social 230 0.0076 0.0048
30 working_memory 228 0.0177 0.0134
31 pain 217 0.0173 0.0046
Beam et al. 1959
Appendix 1. (continued)
Rank Term Frequency Conceptual Betweenness Functional Betweenness
32 novelty 208 0.0127 0.0016
33 inhibition 204 0.0285 0.0109
34 sensory 200 0.0221 0.0082
35 decision 192 0.0152 0.01
36 encoding 190 0.0219 0.0043
37 error 181 0.0204 0.0148
38 recognition 181 0.043 0.0124
39 sensitivity 178 0.0276 0.0091
40 image 170 0.0193 0.0037
41 outcome 153 0.0273 0.0042
42 risk 149 0.0026 0.002
43 category 147 0.0119 0.0024
44 adaptation 143 0.0237 0.0103
45 judgment 139 0.017 0.0011
46 mental 138 0.0201 0.0051
47 sentence 137 0.0097 0.0022
48 choice 125 0.0197 0.0061
49 shape 122 0.0174 0.0007
50 motion 118 0.0083 0.0066
51 decision_making 112 0.0122 0.0056
52 feedback 111 0.0205 0.0032
53 repetition 110 0.0074 0.007
54 active 108 0.0115 0
55 episodic 106 0.0126 0.003
56 reading 106 0.0159 0.0003
57 understanding 105 0.0045 0.0038
58 verbal 101 0.0116 0.0011
59 ability 99 0.0228 0.0004
60 sequence 99 0.0144 0.0012
61 sound 95 0.0009 0.0001
62 monitoring 94 0.0294 0.0022
63 fear 93 0.003 0.0025
64 scene 93 0.0068 0.0035
65 schizophrenia 93 0.0146 0.0001
66 top–down 91 0.0067 0.0127
67 detection 90 0.0124 0.0089
68 organization 90 0.0093 0.0062
69 affective 83 0.025 0.0019
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Appendix 1. (continued)
Rank Term Frequency Conceptual Betweenness Functional Betweenness
70 discrimination 83 0.036 0.0022
71 phonological 83 0.0024 0.0012
72 knowledge 80 0.0153 0.0017
73 resting 78 0.0045 0.0028
74 sensorimotor 77 0.0052 0.0051
75 suppression 76 0.0177 0.0034
76 priming 73 0.0256 0.0005
77 future 71 0.0028 0.0018
78 executive 69 0.0068 0.0038
79 development 67 0.0056 0.0002
80 thought 66 0.0172 0.0012
81 training 66 0.0029 0.0024
82 interest 64 0.024 0.0065
83 difficulty 62 0.0111 0.0004
84 load 62 0.008 0.0036
85 anticipation 61 0 0.0011
86 interference 61 0.0385 0.0003
87 somatosensory 61 0.0066 0.0116
88 spontaneous 60 0.0074 0.0006
89 anxiety 59 0.0002 0.0005
90 self 59 0.0044 0.0001
91 acquisition 58 0.0014 0.0002
92 recruitment 58 0.0043 0.0019
93 identification 55 0.0133 0.002
94 competition 54 0.0137 0.0008
95 resting-state 54 0.013 0.0001
96 lexical 52 0.0011 0.0006
97 simultaneous 52 0 0.0002
98 maintenance 51 0.0064 0.0011
99 execution 50 0.0012 0.0002
100 moral 50 0.0025 0.0005
The top 100 concept terms used in the generation of the meta-network. Terms are sorted by frequency and listed with betweenness centrality values
for each term when it appeared in the Conceptual Network and in the Functional Network.
Beam et al. 1961
Appendix 2. Anatomy Terms, Frequencies, and Centralities
Rank Term Frequency Anatomical Betweenness Functional Betweenness
1 prefrontal_cortex (PFC) 356 0.0618 0.0923
2 amygdala 329 0.0432 0.087
3 anterior_cingulate_cortex (ACC) 272 0.0401 0.0456
4 hippocampus 269 0.039 0.059
5 parietal_cortex 227 0.0357 0.0705
6 visual_cortex 177 0.0087 0.0553
7 intraparietal_sulcus 152 0.0291 0.0227
8 medial_prefrontal_cortex (mPFC) 138 0.0168 0.0211
9 insula 131 0.0839 0.0225
10 cerebellum 129 0.0614 0.0126
11 inferior_frontal_gyrus 128 0.033 0.0242
12 frontal 127 0.0683 0.0253
13 primary_visual_cortex (V1) 121 0.0132 0.0103
14 medial_temporal_lobe (MTL) 112 0.0134 0.0142
15 thalamus 101 0.1058 0.0115
16 dorsolateral_prefrontal_cortex (dlPFC) 97 0.0834 0.0199
17 precuneus 93 0.0684 0.0033
18 striatum 91 0.0074 0.0196
19 premotor_cortex 90 0.078 0.0153
20 orbitofrontal_cortex (OFC) 89 0.0197 0.0108
21 superior_temporal_sulcus 88 0.0199 0.0156
22 occipital_cortex 87 0.0776 0.0119
23 supplementary_motor_area (SMA) 84 0.0494 0.0024
24 temporoparietal_junction (TPJ) 81 0.0197 0.0106
25 posterior_parietal_cortex 80 0.0004 0.0076
26 basal_ganglia 79 0.0031 0.0036
27 inferior_parietal_lobule 79 0.0327 0.0093
28 superior_temporal_gyrus 79 0.0183 0.0096
29 posterior_cingulate_cortex 75 0.0223 0.0013
30 frontal_cortex 73 0.0893 0.0267
31 primary_motor_cortex (M1) 73 0.0002 0.0022
32 primary_somatosensory_cortex (S1) 72 0.0112 0.0035
33 frontoparietal_cortex 67 0.0765 0.0202
34 subcortical 65 0.0131 0.0034
35 putamen 64 0.0459 0.0043
36 ventromedial_prefrontal_cortex (vmPFC) 64 0.0039 0.0049
37 auditory_cortex 63 0.0077 0.0096
38 left_inferior_frontal_gyrus (LIFG) 55 0.0022 0.014
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Appendix 2. (continued)
Rank Term Frequency Anatomical Betweenness Functional Betweenness
39 ventrolateral_prefrontal_cortex (vlPFC) 53 0 0.004
40 middle_temporal_area (MTA) 51 0.022 0.0032
41 ventral_striatum 50 0.0124 0.0045
42 fusiform_gyrus 49 0.034 0.0047
43 parahippocampus 49 0.0132 0.0022
44 temporal_cortex 49 0.0221 0.0103
45 fusiform 47 0.0188 0.0025
46 nucleus_accumbens 47 0 0.0014
47 anterior_insula 45 0.0304 0.0015
48 frontal_eye_field (FEF) 44 0.0034 0.0044
49 inferior_parietal_cortex 44 0.0107 0.0055
50 middle_temporal_gyrus 43 0.0023 0.0054
51 dorsal_anterior_cingulate_cortex (dACC) 42 0.0012 0.0026
52 midbrain 41 0.0012 0.0021
53 limbic_system 40 0.0071 0.0058
54 mirror_neuron_system 40 0 0.0032
55 caudate 39 0.0368 0.0011
56 brainstem 38 0.0011 0.0008
57 motor_cortex 37 0.0046 0.0035
58 secondary_somatosensory_cortex (S2) 36 0.0037 0.0008
59 visual_area_3 (V3) 36 0.0086 0.0006
60 cingulate 35 0.0084 0.0064
61 cingulate_cortex 33 0.0298 0.0059
62 dorsal_premotor_cortex 33 0.0193 0.0004
63 fusiform_face_area (FFA) 33 0.0023 0.0019
64 dorsomedial_prefrontal_cortex (dmPFC) 32 0.0029 0.0017
65 extrastriate 32 0.0084 0.0058
66 angular_gyrus 31 0.0011 0.0003
67 brocas_area 30 0.0071 0.0074
68 middle_frontal_gyrus 28 0.006 0
69 parahippocampal_place_area (PPA) 27 0.0053 0.0017
70 posterior_superior_temporal_sulcus 27 0 0.0008
71 somatosensory_cortex 27 0 0.0008
72 visual_area_5 (V5) 27 0.0107 0.001
73 lateral_prefrontal_cortex (lPFC) 26 0.0361 0.0088
74 left_inferior_parietal_cortex 26 0.0097 0.0005
75 periaqueductal_gray 24 0.0002 0.0002
76 temporal_gyrus 24 0.0164 0.0023
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